# Security Peig is built around a single foundational principle: access to business applications should be cryptographically bound to a specific, authorised device — not to a credential that can be stolen, shared, or guessed. ## The threat model Peig addresses Modern access security failures almost always involve one of the following: * **Credential theft** — passwords stolen via phishing, malware, or data breaches * **Credential sharing** — users sharing login details with colleagues, contractors, or attackers * **Credential stuffing** — automated attacks using leaked credentials from other breaches * **MFA bypass** — push notification fatigue, SIM swapping, or real-time phishing proxies * **Session hijacking** — stealing authenticated session tokens and replaying them from another device Peig's device-bound access model eliminates the attack surface for all of these. There are no credentials to steal, share, or guess. There is no MFA code to intercept. Sessions are bound to the originating device. ## Core security properties **Device-bound cryptographic identity**\ Every registered device has a unique cryptographic identity, derived from hardware identifiers and bound to the device at onboarding. This identity cannot be transferred, copied, or extracted. **Admin-controlled device registration**\ No device can access the workspace without explicit admin approval. Every onboarding request goes through an identity proofing step where the Access Admin verifies the request before approving it. **Granular, immediate revocation**\ Access can be revoked at the user, device, or service level — and takes effect immediately. There is no delay and no residual access window. **No shared secrets**\ Peig does not use passwords or any credential that exists in more than one place. The cryptographic keys that identify a device exist only on that device. ## What Peig does not protect against It is important to be clear about the scope of Peig's security model: * **Device compromise** — if an attacker gains physical access to a registered, unlocked device, they can access services through it. Device-level security — screen lock, disk encryption, OS security — remains the responsibility of the device owner and any applicable device management tools * **Insider threats** — if a legitimate user on a registered device intentionally misuses their access, Peig's access controls do not prevent that. Access scoping and audit logs are the relevant mitigations * **Application-layer vulnerabilities** — Peig secures authentication. Vulnerabilities within connected applications are outside Peig's scope ## In this section * [Cryptography and Protocol](/welcome-to-peig-documentation/security/cryptography-and-protocol.md) — the cryptographic mechanisms behind device binding and authentication * [Access Control](/welcome-to-peig-documentation/security/access-control.md) — how access policy is enforced across users, devices, and services --- # Agent Instructions: Querying This Documentation If you need additional information that is not directly available in this page, you can query the documentation dynamically by asking a question. Perform an HTTP GET request on the current page URL with the `ask` query parameter: ``` GET https://docs.peig.io/welcome-to-peig-documentation/security.md?ask= ``` The question should be specific, self-contained, and written in natural language. The response will contain a direct answer to the question and relevant excerpts and sources from the documentation. Use this mechanism when the answer is not explicitly present in the current page, you need clarification or additional context, or you want to retrieve related documentation sections.